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Viewing cable 09STATE7877, ENGAGING THE ROC REGARDING THE M/V MONCHEGORSK

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Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#09STATE7877**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
09STATE7877	2009-01-29 06:51	2011-08-30 01:44	SECRET//NOFORN	Secretary of State

Appears in these articles:

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/28/2039
TAGS: [MNUC](#) [PARM](#) [PREL](#) [CY](#) [IR](#) [SY](#)
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE ROC REGARDING THE M/V MONCHEGORSK

REF: A. STATE 5968
[¶](#)B. EUR/SE-EMBASSY O-I OF JANUARY 26

Classified by: ASSISTANT SECRETARY DANIEL FRIED, EUR.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).

[¶](#)1. (U) This is an Action Request. Please see paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Background and Objective: The M/V MONCHEGORSK, a Cypriot-flagged, Russian owned vessel leased by Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL), left Bandar Abbas, Iran in mid-January, bound for Latakia, Syria. On January 19 and 20, U.S. naval forces in the Red Sea twice boarded the vessel with the master's consent to inspect the cargo. Initial reports indicated that the cargo consisted of large-caliber cannon shells and small arms ammunition-related components. A more thorough examination of the data resulting from the inspection indicates that the portion of the cargo that was inspected consisted of components, including propellant, for various caliber artillery, tank, and small arms rounds. Based on these additional details, we consider this shipment of "arms or related material" from Iran a violation of UNSCR 1747.

¶3. (S) The Republic of Cyprus (ROC) agreed to take action as the flag state and issued a voluntary recall of the Monchegorsk to port in Cyprus. Updated information as of 1900 EST, January 28, 2009, indicated the vessel was prepared to proceed to Limassol, Cyprus and would probably arrive early the morning of 29 January. The Department requests Embassy Nicosia to urge the ROC to be as assertive as possible in encouraging the ROC to conduct a thorough inspection of the cargo.

¶4. (S/REL CYPRUS) Action Request: Embassy Nicosia is asked to use, as needed, the following points with ROC officials.

Begin Points

-- There is continued concern at the highest levels of the USG about the cargo of the M/V Monchegorsk.

--Following the U.S. Naval personnel boarding of the M/V Monchegorsk on January 19 and 20, the USG believes the transfer of cargo on board may be a violation of UNSCR ¶1747.

--Given our knowledge of this transshipment, we may need to raise this issue at the UN Security Council.

--We would like to fully coordinate any actions taken by our Mission in NY with your government.

--We would especially like to be able to refer to the positive actions taken by Cyprus to ensure this ship was not allowed to violate the terms of UNSCR 1747.

--In particular, we would again strongly urge the ROC to be as assertive as possible in instructing the Monchegorsk to dock in Cyprus, so a thorough inspection of the cargo can take place.

-- However, if the ship arrives in Syria, without the ROC's best efforts to support the relevant UNSCRs, the USG would not be able to portray the ROC's actions in the most positive light. As UNSCR 1747 makes clear in para 5, "States shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran by their nationals, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, and whether or not originating in the territory of Iran.

--The USG remains willing to assist in any way possible.

End Points

¶5. (S/REL CYPRUS) The following points may also be reiterated at Post's discretion. These points are drawn from Ref. B.

Begin Points

--Under Article 41 of the UN Charter, the Security

Council may decide what measures are to be employed to give effect to its decisions and it may call upon Member States to apply such measures. Under Article 25 of the Charter, UN member states have agreed to accept and carry out the Council's decisions in accordance with the Charter.

--Under operative paragraph 5 of UNSCR 1747, unanimously adopted under Article 41, the Security Council decided that:

-Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory? any arms or related materiel; and

-all states shall prohibit the procurement of such items from Iran? using their flag vessels or aircraft.

-The Cypriot-flagged vessel M/V MONCHEGORSK is carrying Iranian-origin arms-related military cargo to Syria.

-An inspection conducted by a US Navy ship on January 19 and 20 revealed containers carrying 120 mm, 122 mm, 125 mm, and 160 mm high explosives that originated in Iran and are destined for Syria. Inspection also revealed 7.62 mm shell casings, compressed gunpowder, silver dollar-sized slugs, primer, and magnesium primers.

-Consequently, Cyprus has an obligation to prevent the use of the M/V MONCHEGORSK - a Cypriot-flagged vessel -- from participating in this transaction.

-In addition, Operative Paragraph 11 of UNSCR 1803 calls upon states to inspect cargoes to and from Iran, of aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the aircraft or vessel is transporting prohibited goods.

-It is extremely important that Cyprus take positive action to stop this shipment in order to protect the integrity and sound reputation of its ship registry.

End Points

END TEXT.

CLINTON